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ABSTRACT The work gives a global overview of information technology’s industrial 
security standards. These are widely used internationally, and include, for example, ISO/IEC 
27001:2005 ( the new international standard of the Information Security Management 
System) and ISO/IEC 27002 dealing with the practical rules for controlling information 
safety, the Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT), Information 
Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), Common Criteria for IT Security 
Evaluation (CC), and the classic Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC). 
The article introduces forms of regulation in the field of IT security and their conceptual 
aims. It summarizes all computer security related law in Hungary in the business sector: data 
protection, electronic commerce, electronic communications, financial institutions and 
electronic signatures. 
The author indicates the importance of using standards in order to strengthen computer 
security, and the work shows which standards are obligatory under Hungarian law and which 
standards are most commonly used by companies and other civil entities. 
 
 
1. Foreword 
 
In the ‘80s, it was thought that the huge advances of electronics and computer technology 
meant total priority for IT in society. In other words, when the Internet became popular and 
accessible for everyone, it was not only government organisations and scientists who thought 
that, in the ‘90s, everyone would shop via the Internet and that paper-based mail and data 
storage would be taken over by computers. Now, in the twenty-first century, we know that 
this was simply a dream. Why? 
The intensive enhancement of technology, opportunities and purchasing power did not 
involve application development at the same speed and also the security of network-based 
activities did not reach a confidence-inspiring level. The enhancement and legal usability of 
public key cryptography and strong secret key algorithms made it possible for computer users 
to have secure communication, but it is still not enough. The security of a computer hardware 
element, computer system or network needs a comprehensive approach and so the security of 
the weakest link determines the security level of the total system. 
The aim is to consolidate the security of IT elements, systems and networks at the same 
level in every respect. This consolidation can be generated by an evaluation of the existing 
systems or by designing new ones. Assessing security levels without standard requirements is 
possible, but not reliable. This work introduces those procedures which enable uniformity of 
the levels of IT security, the legal requirements in Hungary and current practice in using 
standards. 
 
2. Standards 
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 IT security standards give a universal framework to achieve a solid level in computer 
systems and networks. These make assessment easier and give the possibility to use the 
results elsewhere - for example, as an element of quality management or of a financial audit. 
There are a number of standards, but all differ in their focus and approach. Some are quality 
standards with built-in result feedback. 
According to Act XXVIII of 1995 on National Standardisation Section 6, the use of 
national standards should be voluntary. Legislation governing technical matters may cite the 
application of a national standard as being compliant with the relevant requirements laid 
down in legislation. 
The applicability and usability of standards differ markedly2 and the choice of a standard 
for a particular task needs knowledge both of standards and requirements. 
 
2.1 TCSEC 
 
Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) was the first notable standard in 
the field of IT security. It was written by the Department of Defense of the United States of 
America in 1983, revised in 1985 and issued with ID DoD 5200.28-STD. TCSEC deals with 
the assessment of the level of a computer system’s security. The data on the systems are the 
subject of state- or service secrecy, or, in other words, classified information. TCSEC, which 
was called the Orange Book (the colour of its cover) was a genuine military IT security 
standard written in the Cold War. TCSEC was created mainly for the U. S. Government and 
the armed forces. For the practical use of TCSEC the different services made their regulations 
to link their requirements to the specific situation. Army Regulation 380-19 can be an 
example for regulation of services. Although TCSEC is still used in U. S. government and 
military applications3, it is now obsolete. 
TCSEC highlighted the significance of security policies, which need to be well-defined 
and enforced by the system. The policy can be mandatory (with full access control) or 
discretionary. Accountability must be also assured, which means that all activities in the 
system have to be bound to a user (identification), the user’s authorization resources have to 
be verified (authentication), the logs have to protected and authorized personnel can easily 
access and process them (auditing). These requirements are met by assurance mechanisms. 
These mechanisms can be operational, such as system architecture, integrity, trusted facility 
management and trusted recovery. They can be life-cycle assurances such as security testing, 
design specification and verification, configuration management and trusted distribution. All 
of these functions have to be continuously protected against unauthorised changes. All classes 
described later differ in terms of the documentation required, such as test and design 
documentation, trusted facility manual and the security features user's guide. 
The categorisation of security levels in the TCSEC is divided into four divisions and 
several sub-classes. These categories are4: 
 D: Minimal Protection 
 Evaluated systems, that has failed to meet the requirements for a higher division.  
 C: Discretionary Protection 
 C1: Discretionary Security Protection. In this level, the separation of users and data, 
i.e., Discretionary Access Control (DAC) capable of enforcing access limitations on 
an individual basis is required. 
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  C2: Controlled Access Protection. More finely grained DAC, individual 
accountability through log-in procedures, audit trails and resource isolation are 
required. 
 B: Mandatory Protection 
 B1: Labelled Security Protection. Informal statement of the security policy model, 
data sensitivity labels, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) over select subjects and 
objects, label exportation capabilities are required. All discovered flaws must be 
removed or otherwise mitigated. 
 B2: Structured Protection. Requirements are: security policy model clearly defined 
and formally documented, DAC and MAC enforcement extended to all subjects and 
objects, covert storage channels are analyzed for occurrence and bandwidth, 
carefully structured into protection-critical and non-protection-critical elements, 
design and implementation enable more comprehensive testing and review, 
authentication mechanisms are strengthened, trusted facility management is provided 
with administrator and operator segregation, strict configuration management 
controls are imposed. 
 B3: Security Domains. Satisfies reference monitor requirements, structured to 
exclude codes not essential to security policy enforcement, significant system 
engineering directed toward minimizing complexity, security administrator is 
supported, audit security-relevant events, automated imminent intrusion detection, 
notification, and response, trusted system recovery procedures, covert timing 
channels are analyzed for occurrence and bandwidth. 
 A: Verified Protection 
 A1: Verified Design. Functionally identical to B3, but requires formal design and 
verification techniques including a formal top-level specification, formal 
management and distribution procedures. 
 Beyond A1. System Architecture demonstrates that the requirements of self-
protection and completeness for reference monitors have been implemented in the 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Security Testing automatically generates test-case 
from the formal top-level specification or formal lower-level specifications. Formal 
Specification and Verification is where the TCB is verified down to source code 
level, using formal verification methods where feasible. Trusted Design Environment 
is where the TCB is designed in a trusted facility with only trusted (cleared) 
personnel. 
 
2.2 ITSEC 
 
As the European equivalent of TCSEC, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and 
Germany created the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC). The 
ITSEC version 1.2 was experimentally published in 1991 for the European Communities. 
ITSEC is quite similar to TCSEC in its principles and requirements, but ITSEC defines 
specific requirements for IT system types. ITSEC has been largely replaced by Common 
Criteria, which provides evaluation levels defined similarly and implements the target of 
evaluation (TOE) concept and the Security Target (ST) document, providing sophisticated 
evaluation. ITSEC defines seven evaluation levels in respect of confidence in the correctness 
of a Target of Evaluation (TOE). E0 designates the lowest level and E6 the highest.  
The seven evaluation levels can be characterised as follows5: 
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  Level E0. This level represents inadequate assurance. 
 Level E1. At this level there shall be a security target and an informal description of the 
architectural design of the TOE. Functional testing shall indicate that the TOE satisfies 
its security target. 
 Level E2. In addition to the requirements for level E1, there shall be an informal 
description of the detailed design. Evidence of functional testing shall be evaluated. 
There shall be a configuration control system and an approved distribution procedure. 
 Level E3. In addition to the requirements for level E2, the source code and/or hardware 
drawings corresponding to the security mechanisms shall be evaluated. Evidence of 
testing of those mechanisms shall be evaluated. 
 Level E4. In addition to the requirements for level E3, there shall be an underlying 
formal model of security policy supporting the security target. The security enforcing 
functions, the architectural design and the detailed design shall be specified in a 
semiformal style. 
 Level E5. In addition to the requirements for level E4, there shall be a close 
correspondence between the detailed design and the source code and/or hardware 
drawings. 
 Level E6. In addition to the requirements for level E5, the security enforcing functions 
and the architectural design shall be specified in a formal style, consistent with the 
specified underlying formal model of security policy. 
There are ten Example Functionality Classes in ITSEC.6 These are made to give system 
specific requirements.  Example Functionality Classes F-C1, F-C2, F-B1, F-B2, F-B3 have 
been derived from the functionality requirements of TCSEC classes. Example Functionality 
Class F-IN is for TOEs with high integrity requirements for data and programs. It can be used 
for example in database systems. Example Functionality Class F-AV has high availability 
requirements, it is recommended for industrial controllers. In Example Functionality Class F-
DI the highest priority is the data integrity during data exchange. Example Functionality Class 
F-DC is for TOEs and has to give maximal confidentiality during the data exchange, for 
example these can be cryptographic systems. Example Functionality Class F-DX is meant for 
networks with high demands on the confidentiality and integrity of the information to be 
exchanged. For example, this can be in case when sensitive information has to be exchanged 
via insecure networks. 
 
2.3 Common Criteria 
 
Aimed to make an international standard, the European Communities, the United States 
and Canada made the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, 
shortly called Common Criteria (CC). Its version 2.0 became an international standard 
ISO/IEC 15408 “Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation, version 
2.0”. In Hungary the Inter-Departmental Committee for Informatics (ITB) issued the CC v2.0 
as Recommendation 16. The actual version is CC v3.1. It is freely accessible at 
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/. 
The Common Criteria has three parts:7 
 Part 1: Introduction and general model 
 Part 2: Security functional requirements 
 Part 3: Security assurance requirements 
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 The Common Criteria has eleven functionality classes in which the functional 
requirements are detailed. These are:8 
 Class FAU: Security audit 
 Class FCO: Communication 
 Class FCS: Cryptographic support 
 Class FDP: User data protection 
 Class FIA: Identification and authentication 
 Class FMT: Security management 
 Class FPR: Privacy 
 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF 
 Class FRU: Resource utilisation 
 Class FTA: TOE access 
 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels 
There are several families in each class and several components in each family which are 
indicated as, for example, FAU_ARP.1. All the components are expressions concerning the 
requirement. 
The assurance classes are:9 
 Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation  
 Class ASE: Security Target evaluation 
 Class ADV: Development 
 Class AGD: Guidance documents 
 Class ALC: Life cycle support 
 Class ATE: Tests 
 Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment 
 Class ACO: Composition 
The level of security is determined by the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) like the Ex 
levels in the ITSEC. These are10: 
 EAL1 - functionally tested 
 EAL2 - structurally tested 
 EAL3 - methodically tested and checked 
 EAL4 - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed 
 EAL5 – semi-formally designed and tested 
 EAL6 – semi=formally verified design and tested 
 EAL7 - formally verified design and tested 
Common Criteria is supplemented with Common Methodology for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation (CEM). This evaluation methodology is also standardized as 
ISO/IEC 18045:2008. 
 
2.4 ITIL 
 
The IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) was developed by the Central Computing and 
Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) of the United Kingdom for supporting high quality 
cost-effective IT services. Thus ITIL is not only an IT security standard, but the best practice 
collection in the field of IT services. ITIL framework is a source of good practice in service 
management. ITIL is used by organizations worldwide to establish and improve capabilities 
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 in service management. It follows the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model. Security related 
matters are embedded in the standard as IT service continuity issues. The ITIL was developed 
in the 80s, and the current version is v3 (issued in 2007) although under constant 
development. Now it is maintained by United Kingdom's Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC). The ITIL Service Management became a British Standard BS 15000 and later an 
international standard ISO/IEC 20000. 
The library contains five key ITIL books:11 
 Service Strategy 
 Service Design 
 Service Transition 
 Service Operation 
 Continual Service Improvement 
 
2.5 ISO 27000 family 
 
The United Kingdom Government's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was written 
IT security standard BS 7799. Its approach was different from the earlier standards, because it 
has up-down logic. All requirements are started from business needs. ‘The standard 
established guidelines and general principles for initiating, implementing, maintaining, and 
improving information security management within an organization. The actual controls listed 
in the standard are intended to address the specific requirements identified via a formal risk 
assessment. The standard is also intended to provide a guide for the development of 
organizational security standards and effective security management practices and to help 
build confidence in inter-organizational activities’.12 
The BS 7799, where the BS stands for British Standard, was issued by the British 
Standards Institute in 1995. This original part was called Part 1. It became an international 
standard, called ISO/IEC 17799:2000 "Information Technology - Code of practice for 
information security management". 
The British Standards Institute attached a second part to BS 7799 in 1999, named BS 7799-
2 or BS 7799 Part 2 "Information Security Management Systems - Specification with 
guidance for use." The International Organization for Standardization and the IEC adopted it 
to an international standard ISO/IEC 27001:2005. The standard determines the requirements 
for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving 
a documented Information Security Management System (ISMS) and specifies requirements 
for the management of the implementation of security controls. It follows the Plan-Do-Check-
Act (PDCA) model. The ISO/IEC 27001 aligns with quality assurance standards like ISO 
9001 or ISO 14001. It is recommended to use this standard together with ISO/IEC 
17799:2005. ISO/IEC 27001 is applicable to all organisations. It has process approach. 
Due to forming a new family of standards, ISO/IEC 17799:2005 was renumbered to 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005. New family member standards are ISO/IEC 27005 methodology 
independent ISO standard for information security risk management (evolved from ISO/IEC 
13335-3 and ISO/IEC 13335-4) and ISO 27006 providing guidelines for the accreditation of 
organizations offering ISMS certification. Numerous new standards will be a part of 27000 
family, like ISO/IEC 27003, intended to offer guidance for the implementation of an ISMS 
(IS Management System); ISO/IEC 27004 covering information security system management 
measurement and metrics.13 
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 The content sections of the ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard are14. 
 Introduction 
 Scope 
 Normative references 
 Terms and definitions 
 Information security management system 
 Management responsibility 
 Internal ISMS audits 
 Management review of the ISMS 
 ISMS improvements 
 Annex A - Control objectives and controls 
 Annex B - OECD principles and this International Standard 
 Annex C - Correspondence between ISO 9001:2000, ISO 14001:2004 and this 
International Standard 
The ISO/IEC 27002:2005 consists of the following chapters15. 
 Introduction 
 Scope 
 Terms and definitions 
 Structure of this standard 
 Risk assessment and treatment 
 Security policy 
 Organization of information security 
 Asset management 
 Human resources security 
 Physical and environmental security 
 Communications and operations management 
 Access control 
 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance 
 Information security incident management 
 Business continuity management 
 Compliance 
 
2.6 COBIT 
 
In 1992 the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), and the IT 
Governance Institute (ITGI) issued the Control Objectives for Information and related 
Technology (COBIT), which is a framework for IT management. COBIT is a best practice 
collection based on business requirements. It has not become a standard and is also not 
intended to be that. The current version, COBIT 4.1 has 34 high-level processes that cover 
210 control objectives categorized in four domains: Planning and Organization, Acquisition 
and Implementation, Delivery and Support, and Monitoring and Evaluation. Although it is not 
designed to collaborate with other standards, a number of mappings were made to improve 
collaboration and bind requirements between other standards like ITIL, ISO 27002 and 
PMBOK16. 
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 The controlled processes by the COBIT are the following17. 
 Plan and Organise 
 PO1 Define a strategic IT plan. 
 PO2 Define the information architecture. 
 PO3 Determine technological direction. 
 PO4 Define IT processes, organisation and relationships. 
 PO5 Manage IT investment. 
 PO6 Communicate management aims and direction. 
 PO7 Manage IT human resources. 
 PO8 Manage quality. 
 PO9 Assess and manage IT risks. 
 PO10 Manage projects. 
 Acquire and Implement 
 AI1 Identify automated solutions. 
 AI2 Acquire and maintain application software. 
 AI3 Acquire and maintain technology infrastructure. 
 AI4 Enable operation and use. 
 AI5 Procure IT resources. 
 AI6 Manage changes. 
 AI7 Install and accredit solutions and changes. 
 Deliver and Support 
 DS1 Define and manage service levels. 
 DS2 Manage third-party services. 
 DS3 Manage performance and capacity. 
 DS4 Ensure continuous service. 
 DS5 Ensure systems security. 
 DS6 Identify and allocate costs. 
 DS7 Educate and train users. 
 DS8 Manage service desk and incidents. 
 DS9 Manage the configuration. 
 DS10 Manage problems. 
 DS11 Manage data. 
 DS12 Manage the physical environment. 
 DS13 Manage operations. 
 Monitor and Evaluate 
 ME1 Monitor and evaluate IT performance. 
 ME2 Monitor and evaluate internal control. 
 ME3 Ensure compliance with external requirements. 
 ME4 Provide IT governance. 
 
3. Legal requirements 
 
The first and most fundamental level of requirements and unification of security is the 
legal basis. Legal requirements for IT security are constituted by the legislator mostly to 
increase public confidence in business and government processes. This confidence is achieved 
by various sophisticated requirements in different sectors. In this part I will introduce only the 
act-level regulation of different business fields - due to limitations on space. 
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3.1 Data protection 
 
As a general obligation, all institutions managing and processing personal data, except 
private users, fall under Act LXIII of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and the 
Disclosure of Information of Public Interest. Section 10 concerning Security of Processing: 
(1) Data managers, and, within their sphere of competence, data processors must 
implement adequate safeguards and appropriate technical and organizational measures to 
protect personal data, as well as adequate procedural rules to enforce the provisions of this 
Act and other regulations concerning confidentiality and security of data processing. 
(2) Data must be protected against unauthorized access, alteration, transfer, disclosure by 
transmission or deletion as well as damage and accidental destruction. For the technical 
protection of personal data, the controller, the processor or the operator of the 
telecommunications or information technology equipment shall implement security measures 
in particular if the processing involves the transmission of data over a network or any other 
means of information technology. 
This is not detailed and explained; no controls are built into the law. The Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information can supervise those data 
management and data processing, but has no coercive power, and publicity is effective only in 
government cases. The Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code specifies Misuse of Personal 
Data in Section 177/A. statement of facts: 
(1) Any person who, in violation of the statutory provisions governing the protection and 
processing of personal data: 
a) is engaged in the unauthorized and inappropriate processing of personal data; 
b) fails to notify the data subject as required by law; 
c) fails to take measures to ensure the security of data; 
and thereby imposes significant injury to the interests of another person or persons is 
guilty of a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment for up to one year, community service, 
or a fine. 
(2) The acts described under Subsection (1) shall be upgraded to felonies and punishable 
by imprisonment for up to three years if they are committed by a public official in the course 
of discharging a public duty or in the pursuit of unlawful financial gain or advantage. 
(3) Any misuse of special personal data shall be treated as a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for up to three years. 
 
3.2 Electronic commerce 
 
Act CVIII of 2001 on Electronic Commerce and on Information Society Services Section 
4, Information to be provided in connection with Information Society services: 
 (3) Service providers shall provide general information concerning the level of security 
employed in the applied systems of information technology, the risk factors to which users are 
exposed, and the precautions they are required to take. 
In this case, no obligations are declared regarding security, but informing clients is 
obligatory. This form of regulation generates a need for individual discretion and later the 
improvement of service quality through client demand. This approach is similar to quality 
assurance. Real obligations and aims are formed by the customers. 
 
3.3 Electronic Communication 
 
Act C of 2003 on Electronic Communications Section 156: 
 (1) Service providers shall take appropriate technical and organizational measures - 
jointly with other service providers if necessary - in order to safeguard the security of their 
services. 
The focal point of this paragraph is the intended cooperation between service providers for 
security reasons. This means mostly access control measures. 
(2) The technical and organizational measures shall be sufficient - with regard to best 
practices and the costs of the proposed measures - to afford a level of security appropriate to 
the risk presented in connection with the services provided. 
This requirement suggests risk assessment and appropriate security measures. Despite 
significance and sensitivity of ICT area, the regulation and detailed requirements are scanty, 
even in decree-level regulations. 
 
3.4 FPial sector 
 
Financial sector is regulated by Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial 
Enterprises (Hpt.), Act LXXXII of 1997 on Private Pensions and Private Pension Funds 
(Mpt.), Act XCVI of 1993 on Voluntary Mutual Insurance Funds (Öpt.), Act CXX of 2001 on 
the Capital Market (Tpt.) and Act LX of 2003 on Insurance Companies and Insurance 
Activity (Bit.). 
Before 2004 the regulation of this field was similar to data protection act. Hpt. section 13. 
about Personnel and Material Requirements was the only obligation of security: 
(1) Financial service activities may be only commenced or performed if the requirements 
pertaining to 
d) the technological, informatics, technical, and security background and the premises 
suitable for carrying out the activities, 
f) information and control system for reducing operating risks, and a plan for handling 
extraordinary situations 
More details and a more precise requirement list were introduced by Act XXII of 2004 on 
Amendment of Acts Related to Increased Defence of Investors and Depositors and Act CI of 
2004 on Amendment of Acts Related to Taxes, Contributions and Other Budget Payments. 
These Acts embodied requirements similar to those of the Protection of Information Systems 
to Hpt. 13/B. §, Mpt. 77/A. §, Öpt. 40/C. § and Tpt. 101/A. §.18 Bit. was not amended, but the 
same controls are recommended by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority19. 
(1) Financial institutions are required to set up a regulatory regime concerning the 
security of their information systems used for providing financial services and financial 
mediation, and to provide adequate protection for the information system consistent with 
existing security risks. The regulatory regime shall contain provisions concerning 
requirements of information technology, the assessment and handling of security risks in the 
fields of planning, purchasing, operations and control. 
The regulatory regime refers to the system of regulations such as IT security policy, IT 
security laws, IT operational regulations. These regulations should be made and regularly (for 
example yearly) updated by the management. All users must know the relevant regulations. 
(2) Financial institutions shall review and update the security risk assessment profile of the 
information system whenever necessary, or at least every other year. 
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 The organisation must implement a risk assessment procedure and regular assessments. In 
case of usage of outsourced services, the organisation must include the outsourced areas to the 
assessment, also. 
(3) The organizational and operating rules shall be drawn up in the light of the security 
risks inherent in the use of information technology, as well as the rules governing 
responsibilities, records and the disclosure of information, and the control procedures and 
regulations integrated into the system. 
Roles, tasks and responsibilities have to be clearly defined without any incongruity. Scope 
of authority of workers has to be adequate to the role and responsibility. A Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) position should be formed to be responsible for IT. 
(4) Financial institutions shall install an information technology control system to monitor 
the information system for security considerations, and shall keep this system operational at 
all times. 
This requirement does not refer to a computer system or application, but to a set of controls 
and effective internal audit system. This control system has to be regularly revised, and 
activity and effectiveness should be measured.  
(5) Based on the findings of the security risk analysis, the following utilities shall be 
implemented as consistent with the existing security risks: 
Risk assessment in paragraph (2) is the starting point of the following. 
a) clear identification of major system constituents (tools, processes, persons) and keeping 
logs and records accordingly;  
The organisation has to make an inventory of configuration. The actual state and all 
previous states have to be accessible and at all times up-to-date 
b) self-protection function of the information technology security system, checks and 
procedures to ensure the closure and complexity of the protection of critical components; 
At this point, the most important is the conformity of security measures with business and 
organisational requirements. This conformity demands proportionate defensive measures. 
c) frequently monitored user administration system operating in a regulated, managed 
environment (access levels, special entitlements and authorizations, powers and 
responsibilities, entry log, extraordinary events); 
Identity- and access management procedures and rules have to be created, with rules 
responsible for databases. Changes in position or responsibility have to appear immediately in 
access levels. 
d) a security platform designed to keep logs of processes which are deemed critical for the 
operation of the information system and that is capable of processing and evaluating these 
log entries regularly (and automatically if possible), or is capable of managing irregular 
events; 
Application of log analysers used widely in the industry should be used. If not, log saving, 
secure archiving and manual analysis is the minimum. 
e) modules to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data transfer; 
Secure channels or protocols have to be used for communication, such as HTTPS, SSL, 
SSH, SFTP. 
f) modules for handling data carriers in a regulated and safe environment; 
Data storage media, such as DVDs, magnetic tapes have to be stored securely. It is 
necessary to protect them against losses and incidents due to deficiencies of technical 
requirements, electromagnetic disturbances, technical reliability problems, and to protect 
them against intentional damage and access management. 
g) virus protection consistent with the security risks inherent in the system. 
Protection against malicious programs is necessary in servers, desktops and mobile 
devices. 
 (6) Based on their security risk assessment profile financial institutions shall implement 
protection measures to best accommodate their activities and to keep their records safe and 
current, and shall have adopted the following: 
Requirements declared in this point are minimum requirements, all are obligatory. 
a) instructions and specifications for using their information system, and plans for future 
improvements; 
Every system and application has to be documented. All services must have Service Level 
Agreements (SLA). 
b) all such documents which enable the users to operate the information system designed 
to support business operations, whether directly or indirectly, independent of the status of the 
supplier or developer of the system (whether existing or defunct); 
Within the scope of availability plan, all of these acts are included. 
c) an information system that is necessary to provide services and equipment kept in 
reserve to ensure that services can be provided without interruption, or in the absence of such 
equipment, solutions used in their stead to ensure the continuity of activities and/or services; 
Disaster Management Plan and Business Continuity Plan are eligible for this. 
d) an information system that allows running applications to be safely separated from the 
environment used for development and testing, as well as proper management and monitoring 
of upgrades and changes; 
Separation of working and test environments is an industrial common necessity. Also, the 
personnel of these systems should be different. 
e) the software modules of the information system (applications, data, operating system 
and their environment) with backup and save features (types of backup, saving mode, reload 
and restore tests, procedure), to allow the system to be restored within the restoration time 
limit deemed critical in terms of the services provided. These backup files must be stored in a 
fireproof location separately according to risk factors, and the protection of access in the 
same levels as the source files must be provided for; 
System backup operations also should be regularly tested.  
f) a data storage system capable of frequent retrieval of records specified by law to 
provide sufficient facilities to ensure that archived materials are stored as defined  by legal 
regulation, or for at least five years, and able to be retrieved and restored at any time; 
Data retrieval is necessary in many cases, for example, tax revenue, anti-terrorism, data 
protection. A complex solution for all must be implemented, such as a high-security magnetic 
tape data storage system. 
g) an emergency response plan for extraordinary events capable of causing any 
interruption in services. 
Disaster Management Plan and Business Continuity Plan mentioned in paragraph c) are 
eligible for this function. 
(7) Financial institutions shall have available at all times: 
Available at all times means before financial services are authorised, and thereafter on a  
24/7 basis;. 
a) operating instructions and models for inspecting the structure and operation of the 
information system developed by themselves or developed by others on a contract basis; 
All software documentations must be present and up to date. 
b) the syntactical rules and storage structure of data in the information system they have 
developed themselves or  developed by others on a contract basis; 
Software documentations, especially database documentation, must contain data definition. 
c) the scheme of classification of information system components into categories defined by 
the financial institution; 
 The computers, systems and networks have to be classified as to sensitivity. These rules 
have to be documented. 
d) a description of the order of access to data; 
Written rules of access control must be present. 
e) the documents for designating the data manager and the system administrator; 
These documents have to be present in order to ascertain personal responsibilities. 
f) proof of purchase of the software used; 
Also as a tax revenue requirement, all software licences and invoices must be present. A 
software inventory is also necessary. 
g) complex and updated records of administration and business software tools comprising 
the information system. 
A software inventory satisfies this requirement. 
(8) All software shall comprise an integrated system: 
This paragraph defines software minimum requirements. 
a) that is capable of keeping records of the data and information required for regular 
operations and as prescribed by law; 
As mentioned above, long-term preservation is required in more fields. The software also 
has to facilitate this. 
b) that is capable of keeping reliable records of money and securities; 
Since money is nowadays mostly account money (i.e., with no physical form), reliable 
records are essential for trust in the financial system. 
c) that has facilities to connect, directly or indirectly, to national information systems 
appropriate for the activities of the financial institution; 
Most administrative data is changed via computer systems, such as tax revenue, statistical 
information. Implementation and maintaining interfaces to them is the responsibility of the 
organisation. 
d) that is designed for the use of checking stored data and information; 
Embedded controls for data self correction and correction is imperative in such large 
databases.  
e) that has facilities for logic protection consistent with security risks and for preventing 
tampering. 
Value and sensitivity of stored data need endeavour on hardening logical security.  
(9) The internal regulations of the financial institution shall contain provisions concerning 
the knowledge required in the field of information technology for filling certain positions. 
In other fields job descriptions contains required IT knowledge, but financial institutions 
have to determine them in regulations. 
As the mass of requirements shows, financial sector has much more regulations than 
sectors above. Reason of this is the importance and significance of this field. Most citizens 
keep savings in those organisations. A defect in the financial institution drastically decreases 
trust in the sector and the financial system inducing significant losses. 
 
3.5 Electronic signatures 
 
Electronic signature services such as certificate issuing, time-stamping, electronic 
archiving are well regulated in accordance with Directive 1999/93/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council. Act XXXV of 2001 on Electronic Signatures Section 8/B. 
Voluntary Accreditation is the starting point of the regulation. 
(1) Service providers may devise voluntary accreditation schemes to enhance the level of 
their services, and to attest their organizational structure and the products and networks they 
 use in the provision of services, information technology security requirements laid down in 
specific other legislation or any other criteria they choose to adhere to voluntarily. 
Voluntary accreditation is a legal possibility, but all providers are accredited in another 
ways. Currently no voluntary accreditation system operates in Hungary, and in its place there 
is a strict surveillance. 
Section 7.  on notification  
(1) The services referred to in Paragraphs a)-d) of Subsection (1) of Section 6 in 
connection with electronic signatures may be provided by natural persons whose permanent 
or habitual residence is located in Hungary or by legal persons and unincorporated 
organizations that are established or have business establishments in Hungary subject to 
notification of the Communications Authority within 30 days before commencing activities. 
In contrast to electronic communication, in the case of electronic signature services the 
provider has to notify authorities in advance - is a stricter control. 
(2) The following shall be attached with the notification: 
a) service procedures, 
b) general contract terms and conditions, 
c) a certified copy of the document that proves the applicant and his employees have no 
prior criminal record as well as a copy of documents proving their qualifications, 
d) proof of liability insurance coverage and access to other financial resources as 
specified in specific other legislation, and 
e) the authentication system and time-stamping system drafted, respectively, by the 
certification-service-provider and time-stamping service provider. 
Procedures, plans and other proofs have to be sent prior to the start of an electronic 
signature service. The National Communication Authority will review those documents 
before giving permission for the service. Section 9. on Certification Services defines the 
following. 
(1) Prior to contracting, the service provider shall inform the recipient of the service 
concerning the manner of using the service, the level of security, and - where applicable - any 
attestation of their organizational structure and the products and networks they use in the 
provision of services, information technology security requirements laid down in specific 
other legislation, or any other criteria they chose to adhere to voluntarily that have been 
attested under a voluntary accreditation scheme, and the service procedures and the contract 
terms and conditions, in particular the limitations defined in Subsection (2). If the inspection 
referred to in Subsection (3) of Section 20 is not completed at the time of commencement of 
the provision of services, the service provider shall inform the recipient of the service 
accordingly. 
By this self control mechanism, clients should be informed of security measures, and so 
security has become a business requirement. Despite the lack of Parliamentary Act-level 
regulations, more governmental and ministerial decrees define regulations. However, 
electronic signature services are less regulated, and even self-regulation works less effectively 
than in the financial sector. 
 
4. Application and results 
 
From the standards detailed above TCSEC, ITSEC and the Common Criteria could 
primarily be used for evaluating hardware and software elements, but not for complex IT 
systems. For such complex evaluation, the ITIL, the ISO/IEC 27002 and the COBIT can be 
used. ITIL is the most complicated standard; its main function is IT services management, and 
so security is only a subsidiary topic. COBIT was published in the United States by experts 
dealing with financial informatics and so can be used satisfactorily in the field of finance 
 (e.g., in banking informatics). Due to its structure, approach, and detail, ISO/IEC 27002 
together with ISO/IEC 27001 are the most appropriate for using as IT security standards for 
designing and implementing secure systems and networks for IT experts broadly.  
The application of different standards depends on the specifics of the field, international 
practice and the practice of the authorities involved. In respect of general business activities 
(where data protection and electronic commerce regulation apply)  standards are rarely used, 
mostly due to the high cost of implementation and maintenance. European Union projects 
(financial support) demand the application of Common Criteria for products and ISO/IEC 
27002 for organisations20. Firms in the telecommunications sector use no standards or 
ISO/IEC 2700121. Due to the recommendations and practice of the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority, the financial sector mostly uses COBIT – albeit informally22. In the 
field of electronic signature services, current certification service providers use either no 
standards or ISO/IEC 2700123. 
This survey shows, we feel, that a relatively low interest is shown by business in the use of 
international IT security standards, despite their significance and the high risk obvious in 
some areas. No requirement is found in Hungarian Acts of Parliament for the use of standards 
in IT security. There are built-in self control procedures in most Acts, but, in practice, those 
procedures do not work well. Higher level and more technical regulation is recommended, 
and increasing business requirements might enhance the security level in business fields and, 
therefore, at the administrative level also. 
                                                 
20 Council Resolution of [6] December 2001 
21 Homepage of Magyar Telekom Plc. http://www.telekom.hu/rolunk/iranyelveink/minoseg_garanciai 
[2008.12.03.] 
22 PSZÁF op. cit. p. 3. 
23 Homepage of Microsec Ltd. http://srv.e-szigno.hu/menu/index.php?lap=bizt_gar [2008.12.04.] 
